Meet meets join: the interaction between pooled and common knowledge
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Publication:2051513
DOI10.1007/s00182-021-00778-wzbMath1478.91107OpenAlexW3165150463MaRDI QIDQ2051513
Publication date: 24 November 2021
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00778-w
Related Items
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