Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.05.002zbMath1117.91313MaRDI QIDQ2577445

Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, George J. Mailath

Publication date: 22 December 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/working-papers/03-021.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibrium; ex ante payoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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