Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.05.002MaRDI QIDQ2577445zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson

Publication date 22 December 2005

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/working-papers/03-021.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

ex ante payoffsubgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• ON GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION: EQUILIBRIA, ε–EQUILIBRIA AND APPROXIMATION BY SIMPLE GAMES
• Perfect conditional \(\varepsilon \)-equilibria of multi-stage games with infinite sets of signals and actions
• Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
• On refinements of subgame perfect -equilibrium
• Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibria in games with almost perfect information

Cites work

• -consistent equilibrium in repeated games.
• A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with perturbations
• Game theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3238721 (Why is no real title available?)
• Limit games and limit equilibria
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes

Cited in

(13)

• Repeated games with one-memory
• Approximated cooperative equilibria for games played over event trees
• Subgame maxmin strategies in zero-sum stochastic games with tolerance levels
• Payment schemes for sustaining cooperation in dynamic games
• Split it up to create incentives: investment, public goods and crossing the river
• Dynamic benchmark targeting
• On refinements of subgame perfect -equilibrium
• Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
• Perfect conditional \(\varepsilon \)-equilibria of multi-stage games with infinite sets of signals and actions
• Dynamic mechanism design with budget-constrained buyers under limited commitment
• Games with switching costs and endogenous references
• Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability
• Selfish bin packing with punishment

This page was built for publication: Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2577445)