Dynamic benchmark targeting
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Publication:2397633
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.02.004zbMATH Open1400.91144OpenAlexW2589599852MaRDI QIDQ2397633FDOQ2397633
Karl H. Schlag, Andriy Zapechelnyuk
Publication date: 23 May 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/15847
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