Dynamic benchmark targeting
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Publication:2397633
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3128728 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1306865 (Why is no real title available?)
- 10.1162/1532443041424328
- A Randomization Rule for Selecting Forecasts
- A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
- A general class of adaptive strategies
- A wide range no-regret theorem
- Adaptive game playing using multiplicative weights
- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
- Approachability with bounded memory
- Better-reply dynamics with bounded recall
- Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
- Conditional universal consistency.
- Consistency and cautious fictitious play
- Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Handbook of economic forecasting. Volume 1
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Online trading algorithms and robust option pricing
- Potential-based algorithms in on-line prediction and game theory
- Prediction, Learning, and Games
- Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
- Regret in the on-line decision problem
- Routing without regret, on convergence to Nash equilibria of regret-minimizing algorithms in routing games
- The weighted majority algorithm
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