Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability
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Publication:6059545
DOI10.3982/te4575MaRDI QIDQ6059545
Unnamed Author, Sylvain Chassang
Publication date: 2 November 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
approachabilitydynamic allocationonline optimizationlimited liabilityforgivenesspivotrenegotiation-proofnesslendingVCGcautiousness
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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