Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors

DOI10.3982/TE2771zbMATH Open1419.91086OpenAlexW2897885032WikidataQ129048755 ScholiaQ129048755MaRDI QIDQ4612468FDOQ4612468

Authors: Wojciech Olszewski, Mikhail Safronov 

Publication date: 31 January 2019

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2771

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zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyrepeated gameschip strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Money is memory
• Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• Efficiency in games with Markovian private information
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
• Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
• Taking turns
• Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection
• Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions
• Efficient chip strategies in repeated games

Cited In (3)

• On the optimality of monetary trading
• Plausible cooperation
• Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability

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