Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors

DOI10.3982/TE2771MaRDI QIDQ4612468zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Wojciech Olszewski, Mikhail Safronov

Publication date 31 January 2019

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te2771

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyrepeated gameschip strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors
• Strategic information exchange
• Cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with perturbations

Cites work

• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
• Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection
• Efficiency in games with Markovian private information
• Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
• Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
• Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions
• Money is memory
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• Taking turns
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

Cited in

(3)

• On the optimality of monetary trading
• Plausible cooperation
• Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability

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