Repeated games with one-memory
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
- Repeated games with \(M\)-period bounded memory (pure strategies)
- Repeated games with probabilistic horizon
- Finitely Repeated Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3441890
- Finitely many players with bounded recall in infinitely repeated games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4154255
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5150491
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 16099
- Repeated Games
Cites work
- Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria
- Bounded memory folk theorem
- Bounded rationality, neural network and folk theorem in repeated games with discounting
- Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
- Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
- Finitely many players with bounded recall in infinitely repeated games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4202070 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3777289 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592673 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365044 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Repeated games with \(M\)-period bounded memory (pure strategies)
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- Repeated games with one-memory
- Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
- Strategic entropy and complexity in repeated games
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
Cited in
(31)- Repeated games with one-memory
- You play (an action) only once
- Repeated games with \(M\)-period bounded memory (pure strategies)
- Finitely many players with bounded recall in infinitely repeated games
- Bounded memory and incomplete information
- Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game
- Limited focus in dynamic games
- Reactive strategies: an inch of memory, a mile of equilibria
- Selfish optimization and collective learning in populations
- Community enforcement using modal actions
- A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games
- Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory
- Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
- Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game
- Asymmetry of customer loss and recovery under endogenous partnerships: theory and evidence
- Bounded memory folk theorem
- Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information
- Bounded memory and permanent reputations
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- A foundation for Markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory
- Variable temptations and black mark reputations
- Reactive learning strategies for iterated games
- A NOTE ON REPEATED GAMES WITH VANISHING ACTIONS
- Learning with limited memory: Bayesianism vs heuristics
- Forgetful updating and stubborn decision-makers
- Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
- Games with 1-backtracking
- Restricted feedback in long term relationships
- Algorithmic collusion and a Folk theorem from learning with bounded rationality
- Zero-determinant strategies of three-player repeated games under noisy observation
This page was built for publication: Repeated games with one-memory
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1001829)
