You play (an action) only once

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00067-6zbMATH Open0906.90181MaRDI QIDQ1128924FDOQ1128924

Authors: Karl H. Schlag, Aner Sela 

Publication date: 13 August 1998

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

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• Perfect Nash equilibria in finite repeated game and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the constituent game
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zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamessubgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (2)

• Strategies in competing subset selection
• Competitive subset selection with two agents

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