Perfect Nash equilibria in finite repeated game and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the constituent game

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90250-2zbMATH Open1273.91054OpenAlexW2038156579MaRDI QIDQ375071FDOQ375071

Authors: Michel Moreaux 

Publication date: 24 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90250-2

Recommendations

• Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
• Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
• Finitely Repeated Games
• A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games
• Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games

Cited In (3)

• Finite rationalizability and cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Folk theorems for the observable implications of repeated games
• Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in continuous two-player weighted potential games

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