Algorithmic collusion and a Folk theorem from learning with bounded rationality
From MaRDI portal
Cites work
- A partial folk theorem for games with private learning
- A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions
- A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem.
- A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
- A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: genericity, stability, and purification
- Asynchronous stochastic approximation with differential inclusions
- Attainability of boundary points under reinforcement learning
- Best-response dynamics in zero-sum stochastic games
- Bounded memory folk theorem
- Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
- Common learning and cooperation in repeated games
- Conditional universal consistency.
- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
- Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
- Evolving aspirations and cooperation
- Fictitious play in zero-sum stochastic games
- Finite automata equilibria with discounting
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5348356 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48727 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1795161 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405930 (Why is no real title available?)
- Imitation processes with small mutations
- Learning and equilibrium transitions: stochastic stability in discounted stochastic fictitious play
- Learning aspiration in repeated games
- Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
- Learning in perturbed asymmetric games
- Learning mixed equilibria
- Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
- Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation
- Learning to play limited forecast equilibria
- Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium.
- Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games
- Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games
- Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations
- Nonconvergence to unstable points in urn models and stochastic approximations
- Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
- On the convergence of reinforcement learning
- On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Potential games
- Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games
- Q-learning agents in a Cournot oligopoly model
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies
- Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
- Repeated games with one-memory
- Revisiting log-linear learning: asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation
- Stochastic approximation methods for constrained and unconstrained systems
- Stochastic approximations for finite-state Markov chains
- The dynamic system method and the traps
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The logit-response dynamics
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
This page was built for publication: Algorithmic collusion and a Folk theorem from learning with bounded rationality
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6839176)
