A partial folk theorem for games with private learning

DOI10.3982/TE913MaRDI QIDQ4683685zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Thomas Wiseman

Publication date 21 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/TE913

zbMATH Keywords

folk theoremlearningrepeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cited in

(10)

• A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring
• Repeated coordination with private learning
• Privacy-Preserving Public Information for Sequential Games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620862 (Why is no real title available?)
• Stochastic games with hidden states
• A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions
• Learning Sets in State Dependent Signalling Game Forms: A Characterization
• Learning from private information in noisy repeated games
• Algorithmic collusion and a Folk theorem from learning with bounded rationality
• Ruth, anthony, and clarence

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