Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games
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(36)- Perspectives on multiagent learning
- Reputation versus social learning
- Averaged predictions and the learning of equilibrium play
- Social learning in recurring games
- Does rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated games?
- Learning to play limited forecast equilibria
- Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium.
- Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach
- The role of absolute continuity in merging of opinions and rational learning
- Economists' models of learning
- Calibration and Bayesian learning.
- Learning a population distribution
- Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
- The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games
- Counterfactual prediction in complete information games: point prediction under partial identification
- Extensive games with possibly unaware players
- Bidirectional optimization from reasoning and learning in games
- When autonomous agents model other agents: an appeal for altered judgment coupled with mouths, ears, and a little more tape
- Learning, hypothesis testing, and rational-expectations equilibrium
- AWESOME: a general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents
- Online calibrated forecasts: memory efficiency versus universality for learning in games
- Merging and testing opinions
- Predicting human cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma using case-based decision theory
- Belief and truth in hypothesised behaviours
- Learning to coordinate in social networks
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1804105 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5547959 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18237 (Why is no real title available?)
- Beliefs in Repeated Games
- Cooperation and computability in \(n\)-player games
- Sequential optimizing strategy in multi-dimensional bounded forecasting games
- Algorithmic collusion and a Folk theorem from learning with bounded rationality
- Sophisticated reasoning, learning, and equilibrium in repeated games with imperfect feedback
- Gradient descent learning matching the pennies repeated game
- Algorithmic randomness and the weak merging of computable probability measures
- Limits to rational learning
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