Limits to rational learning

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.001zbMath1369.91028OpenAlexW1575024552MaRDI QIDQ893386

Yehuda John Levy

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:4155f14d-6684-495a-9001-a7afc604eda8

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumrepeated gamesrational learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games

Cites Work

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• Bayesian learning in repeated games
• On equivalence of infinite product measures
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• Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
• Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games
• Bayesian Representation of Stochastic Processes under Learning: de Finetti Revisited
• Compatible Measures and Merging

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