The role of absolute continuity in merging of opinions and rational learning
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Publication:1818293
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45445 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52448 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1232374 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 765034 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3394474 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games
- Compatible Measures and Merging
- Learning by forgetful players
- Learning to learn, pattern recognition, and Nash equilibrium
- Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
- Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Weak and strong merging of opinions
Cited in
(8)- Inattention and belief polarization
- Merging of opinions in game-theoretic probability
- Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence
- Merging of opinions and probability kinematics
- Probability, causality and the empirical world: a Bayes-de Finetti-Popper-Borel synthesis
- The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games
- Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium.
- Limits to rational learning
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