The role of absolute continuity in merging of opinions and rational learning

zbMATH Open0996.91026MaRDI QIDQ1818293FDOQ1818293

Authors: Ronald I. Miller, Chris William Sanchirico 

Publication date: 1 February 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Merging of opinions and probability kinematics
• The speed of rational learning
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• Weak and strong merging of opinions
• Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumrepeated gamebetsopinions merge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Weak and strong merging of opinions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Learning by forgetful players
• Compatible Measures and Merging
• Learning to learn, pattern recognition, and Nash equilibrium
• A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games

Cited In (8)

• Inattention and belief polarization
• Merging of opinions and probability kinematics
• Limits to rational learning
• Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence
• Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium.
• The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games
• Merging of opinions in game-theoretic probability
• Probability, causality and the empirical world: a Bayes-de Finetti-Popper-Borel synthesis

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