Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors

DOI10.1007/S001990050206zbMATH Open0911.90371OpenAlexW2077273035MaRDI QIDQ1389242FDOQ1389242

Yaw Nyarko

Publication date: 11 June 1998

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050206

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriabeliefsinfinitely repeated gamesubjective equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (18)

• Learning in Games
• Does rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated games?
• Belief and truth in hypothesised behaviours
• Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
• Stability of functional rational expectations equilibria
• Limits to rational learning
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Can we rationally learn to coordinate?
• Learning a population distribution
• On the structure and diversity of rational beliefs
• A Bayesian optimization approach to find Nash equilibria
• The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games
• Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs
• Repeated large games with incomplete information
• Convergence and approximation results for non-cooperative Bayesian games: Learning theorems
• Bayesian Nash equilibrium and variational inequalities
• Autonomous agents modelling other agents: a comprehensive survey and open problems
• Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games

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