Does rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated games?

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2352zbMath0914.90281MaRDI QIDQ1381971

Alvaro Sandroni

Publication date: 1 April 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2352

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium; infinitely repeated games; rational learning; stage game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Relative entropy in sequential decision problems

Cites Work

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