Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs
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Publication:1367893
DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2254zbMATH Open0887.90003OpenAlexW2022093200MaRDI QIDQ1367893FDOQ1367893
Publication date: 6 May 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/44ff0fc4ba74196550457a5432dc738240d1775f
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Cited In (4)
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