An Example of Convergence to Rational Expectations with Heterogeneous Beliefs

DOI10.2307/2526571zbMath0667.90022OpenAlexW2077665584MaRDI QIDQ3820336

Mark Feldman

Publication date: 1987

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526571

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian agentspartial equilibrium settingstability of rational expectations equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

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Bounded rationality and learning. Introduction ⋮ Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games ⋮ Convergence and approximation results for non-cooperative Bayesian games: Learning theorems ⋮ Bayesian learning and convergence to rational expectations ⋮ Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs ⋮ Learning from others: A welfare analysis ⋮ On the convergence of Bayesian posterior processes in linear economic models. Counting equations and unknowns ⋮ Learning in mis-specified models and the possibility of cycles ⋮ Bayesian learning in normal form games ⋮ Speculative dynamics with bounded rationality learning ⋮ Bounded rational learning in differential information economies: Core and value

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