Bounded rationality and learning. Introduction

DOI10.1007/BF01213813MaRDI QIDQ1339019zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yaw Nyarko, Michael Woodford, Nicholas C. Yannelis

Publication date 27 November 1994

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213813

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitylearning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory for games (91A35) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Review text

This is an introduction to this issue of Econ. Theory, which is completely devoted to the topic `Bounded rationality and learning'.

Cites work

• An Example of Convergence to Rational Expectations with Heterogeneous Beliefs
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• Bounded rationality, neural network and folk theorem in repeated games with discounting
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• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Fictitious play in \(2\times 2\) games: A geometric proof of convergence
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Learning in experimental games
• On rational belief equilibria
• On the structure and diversity of rational beliefs
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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