Bounded rationality and learning. Introduction
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Publication:1339019
DOI10.1007/BF01213813zbMath0807.90149MaRDI QIDQ1339019
Yaw Nyarko, Michael Woodford, Nicholas C. Yannelis
Publication date: 27 November 1994
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- An Example of Convergence to Rational Expectations with Heterogeneous Beliefs
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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