Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory
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Publication:815217
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.09.011zbMATH Open1122.91021OpenAlexW2152912059MaRDI QIDQ815217FDOQ815217
Authors: Eduardo Zambrano
Publication date: 16 February 2006
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=econ_fac
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Cites Work
- Are probabilities used in markets?
- Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs
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- The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
- Pure Strategy Dominance
- Revealed preference, stochastic dominance, and the expected utility hypothesis
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Cited In (14)
- A theory of subjective learning
- Expected utility without parsimony
- On the falsifiability and learnability of decision theories
- TESTING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEPARTURES FROM UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
- Subjective expected utility theory with costly actions
- What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test
- Testable implications of Pareto efficiency and individualrationality
- Great expectations. I: On the customizability of generalized expected utility
- On the rejectability of the subjective expected utility theory
- Utility from anticipation and personal equilibrium
- Dutch Books Arguments and Learning in a Nonexpected Utility Framework
- Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty
- Information theory and observational limitations in decision making
- Believing in forecasts, uncertainty, and rational expectations
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