Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3784593 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 699704 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3056125 (Why is no real title available?)
- Agreeing to disagree
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
- Evolutionary dynamics of spatial games
- Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge
- Knowledge, belief and counterfactual reasoning in games
- On the centipede game
- Probability Theory
- Substantive assumptions in interaction: a logical perspective
- The evolution of cooperation
- The fragility of common knowledge
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