Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies
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Publication:725074
DOI10.3390/G8010003zbMATH Open1407.91061OpenAlexW2563513479MaRDI QIDQ725074FDOQ725074
Publication date: 1 August 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g8010003
Recommendations
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 970198
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- A belief-based evolutionarily stable strategy
- Limits to rational learning
epistemic game theoryevolutionary game theorystrategybackward inductionBayesian epistemologybelief-revision policynaturalistic game theory
Cites Work
- Probability Theory
- On the centipede game
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
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- Agreeing to disagree
- The Evolution of Cooperation
- Evolutionary dynamics of spatial games
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- Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games
- Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
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- The fragility of common knowledge
- Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge
- Substantive assumptions in interaction: a logical perspective
Cited In (3)
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