Extensive games with possibly unaware players

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.11.002zbMath1294.91023MaRDI QIDQ2251674

Leandro C. Rêgo, Joseph Y. Halpern

Publication date: 15 July 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.11.002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A18: Games in extensive form

03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

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