Economists' models of learning
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4078557 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3205074 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3275548 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3069635 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3092988 (Why is no real title available?)
- A comparison of game theory of learning theory
- Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
- Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- An iterative method of solving a game
- Case-based optimization
- Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
- Consistency and cautious fictitious play
- Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
- Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- Evolutionary stability in games of communication
- Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
- Experimentation, imitation, and stochastic stability
- Fictitious play property for games with identical interests
- How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?
- Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
- Learning mixed equilibria
- Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- On the evolution of optimizing behavior
- On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics
- On the nonconvergence of fictitious play in coordination games
- Optimal Learning by Experimentation
- Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
- Payoff assessments without probabilities: a simple dynamic model of choice
- Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
- Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning
- Word-of-mouth learning.
Cited in
(6)- Linear learning in changing environments
- Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games.
- Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
- Rebels lead to the doctrine of the mean: a heterogeneous degroot model
- Local search proximal algorithms as decision dynamics with costs to move
- The intellectual influence of economic journals: quality versus quantity
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