Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3069635 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Note on Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms
- A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms: Experimental evidence
- An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
- Are Groves-Ledyard Equilibria Attainable?
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- Exact implementation
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
- Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches
- Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations
- Learning by forgetful players
- On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
- Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism
- Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
Cited in
(13)- Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
- Implementation theory
- Evolutionary dynamics for the generalized Baliga-Maskin public good model
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Continuous approximations of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- On the hidden hazards of adaptive behavior
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- Mechanism design and bounded rationality: the case of type misreporting
- Evolutionary game theory
- Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games
- AN ITERATIVE PROCEDURE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
- Economists' models of learning
- Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation
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