Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games
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Publication:1934837
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.11.003zbMATH Open1255.91149OpenAlexW2093765837MaRDI QIDQ1934837FDOQ1934837
Authors: Marco Galbiati
Publication date: 29 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/6092
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Cites Work
Cited In (9)
- Coalition formation in games of fair division
- A cake for Cournot
- A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Procedurally fair implementation under complete information
- Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games
- A game of fair division in the normal form
- The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
- The relevance of equal splits in ultimatum games
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