Procedurally fair implementation under complete information

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.06.001zbMath1416.91105OpenAlexW2808862694MaRDI QIDQ1669100

Ville Korpela

Publication date: 30 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.06.001

zbMATH Keywords

symmetryNash equilibriumcharacterizationimplementationex ante fairnessex post fairness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Symmetric mechanism design: comment ⋮ A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution

Cites Work

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