Procedurally fair implementation under complete information
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Publication:1669100
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.06.001zbMATH Open1416.91105OpenAlexW2808862694WikidataQ129650747 ScholiaQ129650747MaRDI QIDQ1669100FDOQ1669100
Authors: Ville Korpela
Publication date: 30 August 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.06.001
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Cites Work
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- Divide-and-permute
- Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
- Symmetric mechanism design
- Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games
- Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results
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