Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results

DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0662-6zbMath1288.91114OpenAlexW2037396784MaRDI QIDQ2452247

Sébastien Rouillon

Publication date: 2 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0662-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Procedurally fair implementation under complete information ⋮ Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
• Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
• Nash implementation of Lindahl allocations
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Toward Natural Implementation
• Nash-Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies

This page was built for publication: Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results