Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0662-6zbMATH Open1288.91114OpenAlexW2037396784MaRDI QIDQ2452247FDOQ2452247

Sébastien Rouillon

Publication date: 2 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0662-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Toward Natural Implementation
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
• Nash implementation of Lindahl allocations
• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
• Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
• Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Nash-Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies

Cited In (2)

• Procedurally fair implementation under complete information
• Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation

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