Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
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Publication:3468841
DOI10.2307/2297504zbMath0693.90022OpenAlexW1998010164MaRDI QIDQ3468841
Publication date: 1989
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297504
Related Items (20)
A simple(r) Lindahl solution to the provision of public goods with warm-glow: efficiency and implementation ⋮ On informational efficiency and incentive aspects of generalized ratio equilibria ⋮ Divide-and-permute ⋮ REPUTATION AND OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR CENTRAL BANKERS ⋮ Implementing Lindahl allocations in a warm-glow economy ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ Procedurally fair implementation under complete information ⋮ Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation ⋮ A solution to the problem of consumption externalities. ⋮ Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results ⋮ On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms ⋮ Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism ⋮ Implementation in production economies with increasing returns ⋮ Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale ⋮ Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations ⋮ Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension ⋮ Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer ⋮ Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations ⋮ Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships ⋮ Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods
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