Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations
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Recommendations
- Implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations
- Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer
- A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
- Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism
- Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations
Cites work
- A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
- An implementable state-ownership system with general variable returns
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
- Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach
- Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism
- Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences
- Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
- Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
- Nash-Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies
- On the constrained Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good
- The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy
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