Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(89)90203-6zbMATH Open1328.91146OpenAlexW1996505118WikidataQ127174157 ScholiaQ127174157MaRDI QIDQ902646FDOQ902646

Pierre de Trenqualye

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(89)90203-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Are Groves-Ledyard Equilibria Attainable?
• Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism
• A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties

Cited In (7)

• Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms
• Implementing Lindahl allocations in a warm-glow economy
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Paths to Stable Allocations
• Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
• Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
• A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods

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