Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(89)90203-6zbMath1328.91146OpenAlexW1996505118WikidataQ127174157 ScholiaQ127174157MaRDI QIDQ902646

Pierre de Trenqualye

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(89)90203-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (5)

Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods ⋮ Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms ⋮ Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information

Cites Work

• A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
• Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Are Groves-Ledyard Equilibria Attainable?
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations

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