Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90156-1MaRDI QIDQ1108174zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pierre de Trenqualye

Publication date 1988

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90156-1

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot best-replay behaviorNash equilibriapublic good economystability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economic growth models (91B62)

Review text

It is shown that the Nash equilibria of the game defined by the Groves and Ledyard mechanism [see \textit{T. Groves} and \textit{J. Ledyard}, Econometrica 45, 783-809 (1977; Zbl 0363.90015)] in a public good economy can be made locally stable under Cournot best-replay behavior and general assumptions on preferences.

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Cites work

• A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Are Groves-Ledyard Equilibria Attainable?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points

Cited in

(9)

• Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
• Are Groves-Ledyard Equilibria Attainable?
• Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms
• A note on the stability of Chen's Lindahl mechanism
• Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
• Counting Groves-Ledyard equilibria via degree theory
• Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations

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