Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism (Q1108174)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4066582
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| English | Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4066582 |
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Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism (English)
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1988
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It is shown that the Nash equilibria of the game defined by the Groves and Ledyard mechanism [see \textit{T. Groves} and \textit{J. Ledyard}, Econometrica 45, 783-809 (1977; Zbl 0363.90015)] in a public good economy can be made locally stable under Cournot best-replay behavior and general assumptions on preferences.
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stability
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Nash equilibria
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public good economy
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Cournot best-replay behavior
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0.82834154
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0.82588786
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0.82114327
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0.8187361
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0.81372666
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0.81363785
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