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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 |
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1979
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incentives
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public decision-making
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elementary exposition
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game theoretic model
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Pareto optimal outcomes
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Clark-Groves mechanism
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dominant strategy
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satisfactory mechanisms
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truthful strategies
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manipulation by coalitions
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incentive compatibility requirements
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Nash equilibria
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large economies
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0.8365684151649475
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0.8111045956611633
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0.8109762668609619
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0.8097477555274963
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0.8097127079963684
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This study is concerned with the possibility of constructing mechanisms which lead to Pareto optimal outcomes and provide incentives for individuals to reveal their preferences correctly. The basic result of Part II is the characterization of the Clark-Groves mechanism. It is shown that when the economic environment is suitably restricted, this mechanism is satisfactory, i.e., there exists a dominant strategy (truth-telling) for every individual, and the outcome is Pareto optimal. Moreover, all satisfactory mechanisms inducing truthful strategies coincide with the set of Groves mechanisms. The authors explore the possibilities of extending this basic result to less restrictive environments. One severe restriction was the absence of income effects. A second possible extension is to stipulate that the outcome must be Pareto optimal for the actual N participants, ignoring the welfare of the outside agency, equivalently, the budget must balance. Thirdly one can study the possibility of designing mechanisms to avoid manipulation by coalitions. Unfortunately, in all cases, the results are negative. The authors also examine weaker incentive compatibility requirements: (i) individuals play their maximin strategies in a game in which there are no dominant strategies; (ii) individuals maximize expected utility, given their beliefs; (iii) Nash equilibria are realized in the game created by the mechanism. In all these cases, the results are positive. The book also gives several interesting results for large economies. When the population mean of the expected willingness to pay for the project is zero, then it is possible to close the system by redistributing any surplus without distorting the incentive properties of the Clark mechanism. A second result is that in large economies, coalitions' gain from cheating is less than the costs of collusion. Unfortunately, both the results are proved assuming no income effects. It is also shown that when the public project under consideration has a positive income effect for all agents, agents will generally understate their net willingness to pay for the project so that projects which should be implemented will be rejected. The above account represents only a small sample of the many interesting results proved in this book. The book will certainly provide very absorbing to everyone interested in incentive compatibility of public decision-making processes.
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