Reputation and optimal contracts for central bankers

DOI10.1017/S1365100510000076zbMATH Open1250.91070MaRDI QIDQ2920156FDOQ2920156

Authors: Kevin X. D. Huang, Guoqiang Tian 

Publication date: 24 October 2012

Published in: Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

reputationmonetary policytime consistencyoptimal contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity, and Dynamic Multiple Equilibria
• The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy
• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
• The Fed's monetary policy rule and U.S. Inflation: The case of asymmetric preferences
• Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
• Monetary control uncertainty and inflation bias.

Cited In (4)

• Optimal contracts for central bankers: calls on inflation
• Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model
• Defending against speculative attacks: the policy Maker's reputation
• Rules without commitment: reputation and incentives

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