Reputation and optimal contracts for central bankers

DOI10.1017/S1365100510000076MaRDI QIDQ2920156zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kevin X. D. Huang, Guoqiang Tian

Publication date 24 October 2012

Published in Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

reputationmonetary policytime consistencyoptimal contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model
• Optimal contracts for central bankers: inflation versus money supply and exchange rate targets
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Cites work

• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
• Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
• Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity, and Dynamic Multiple Equilibria
• Monetary control uncertainty and inflation bias.
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• The Fed's monetary policy rule and U.S. Inflation: The case of asymmetric preferences
• The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy

Cited in

(4)

• Defending against speculative attacks: the policy Maker's reputation
• Optimal contracts for central bankers: calls on inflation
• Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model
• Rules without commitment: reputation and incentives

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