Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2008.03.003zbMATH Open1181.91203OpenAlexW3123750910MaRDI QIDQ2654422FDOQ2654422

Authors: Olivier Loisel 

Publication date: 19 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://publications.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/working-paper_127_2005.pdf

Recommendations

• Reputation and optimal contracts for central bankers
• Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
• Credibility and time consistency in a stochastic world
• Time inconsistency and reputation in monetary policy: a strategic modelling in continuous time
• Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia

zbMATH Keywords

reputationmonetary policyinflation biastimeless perspectivestabilization bias

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing
• MONETARY POLICY OVER TIME
• Sustainable monetary policies
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal monetary policy in a micro-founded model with parameter uncertainty

Cited In (7)

• On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies
• A quantitative analysis of optimal sustainable monetary policies
• Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
• The signaling effect of raising inflation
• Reputation and optimal contracts for central bankers
• Credible forward guidance
• An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers

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