Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00260MaRDI QIDQ4817924zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anne C. Sibert

Publication date 21 September 2004

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00260

zbMATH Keywords

social welfareinflationary toughness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cited in

(11)

• Information acquisition and transparency in committees
• Voting in the limelight
• Revealed votes
• Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?
• Committees, sequential voting and transparency
• Committees with leaks
• Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model
• Designing monetary policy committees
• Career experience, political effects, and voting behavior in the riksbank's monetary policy committee
• Optimal conservatism and collective monetary policymaking under uncertainty
• Expectations for the MPC chair and interest rate persistence

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