Information acquisition and transparency in committees

DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0295-5zbMath1274.91133OpenAlexW3125573746MaRDI QIDQ422363

Hans Gersbach, Volker Hahn

Publication date: 16 May 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/48421

zbMATH Keywords

committeesinformation acquisitiontransparencyexpertscareer concerns

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items (8)

On the drawbacks of large committees ⋮ Optimal conservatism and collective monetary policymaking under uncertainty ⋮ Social influence in committee deliberation ⋮ Private vs. public communication: difference of opinion and reputational concerns ⋮ Committee design with endogenous participation ⋮ Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees ⋮ Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers ⋮ Committees with leaks

Cites Work

• Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?
• Committees, sequential voting and transparency
• Information efficiency and majority decisions
• Deliberative voting
• Information acquisition in committees
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
• Deliberation and Voting Rules
• A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
• Fixed-point and Minimax Theorems in Locally Convex Topological Linear Spaces
• A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem*
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Information acquisition and transparency in committees