Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?

DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0259-7zbMath1135.91340OpenAlexW3125131521MaRDI QIDQ927415

Hans Gersbach, Volker Hahn

Publication date: 6 June 2008

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/2827

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items (13)

Voting in the limelight ⋮ Revealed votes ⋮ On the drawbacks of large committees ⋮ Information acquisition and transparency in committees ⋮ Private vs. public communication: difference of opinion and reputational concerns ⋮ Inflation forecast contracts ⋮ Committee design with endogenous participation ⋮ Committees, sequential voting and transparency ⋮ When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives ⋮ Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees ⋮ How much should central banks talk?: A new argument ⋮ Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers ⋮ Committees with leaks

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart
• Committees, sequential voting and transparency
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Policy Boards and Policy Smoothing*
• Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations

This page was built for publication: Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?