Revealed votes

DOI10.1007/S00355-018-1116-6MaRDI QIDQ1616761zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrei M. Gomberg

Publication date 7 November 2018

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1116-6

zbMATH Keywords

unanimityweighted majoritycommittee choice structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Voting by Committees
• Voting by committees under constraints
• Weighted committee games
• Optimal decision rules for fixed-size committees in polychotomous choice situations
• Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3339023 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• A foundation for strategic agenda voting
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
• Do voters vote ideologically?
• Intuitive Probability on Finite Sets
• Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
• On Constructing Generalized Voting Paradoxes
• Rationalizable voting
• Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• The axioms of subjective probability. With discussion
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

Cited in

(1)

• An algebraic approach to revealed preference

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