Credible forward guidance

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2023.104699OpenAlexW4382052005MaRDI QIDQ6094468

Takeki Sunakawa, Quentin Batista, Taisuke Nakata

Publication date: 14 September 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2019037pap.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

credibilitytime-consistencyeffective lower boundforward guidancesustainable plan

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Credible monetary policy in an infinite horizon model: Recursive approaches
• The signaling effect of raising inflation
• A quantitative analysis of optimal sustainable monetary policies
• Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy
• On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies
• Attenuating the forward guidance puzzle: implications for optimal monetary policy
• Sustainable international monetary policy cooperation
• Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• CREDIBILITY AND INTERTEMPORAL CONSISTENCY
• Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model
• Recursive Contracts
• International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets

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