Credible forward guidance

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2023.104699MaRDI QIDQ6094468zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Quentin Batista, Taisuke Nakata, Takeki Sunakawa

Publication date 14 September 2023

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2019037pap.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

time-consistencycredibilityeffective lower boundforward guidancesustainable plan

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Attenuating the forward guidance puzzle: implications for optimal monetary policy
• On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies
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Cites work

• A quantitative analysis of optimal sustainable monetary policies
• Attenuating the forward guidance puzzle: implications for optimal monetary policy
• CREDIBILITY AND INTERTEMPORAL CONSISTENCY
• Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model
• Credible monetary policy in an infinite horizon model: Recursive approaches
• Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy
• International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets
• On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies
• Recursive contracts
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model
• Sustainable international monetary policy cooperation
• The signaling effect of raising inflation
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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