Credible forward guidance
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Publication:6094468
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2023.104699OpenAlexW4382052005MaRDI QIDQ6094468
Takeki Sunakawa, Quentin Batista, Taisuke Nakata
Publication date: 14 September 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2019037pap.pdf
Cites Work
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- Credible monetary policy in an infinite horizon model: Recursive approaches
- The signaling effect of raising inflation
- A quantitative analysis of optimal sustainable monetary policies
- Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy
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- Attenuating the forward guidance puzzle: implications for optimal monetary policy
- Sustainable international monetary policy cooperation
- Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- CREDIBILITY AND INTERTEMPORAL CONSISTENCY
- Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model
- Recursive Contracts
- International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets
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