Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2014.05.004MaRDI QIDQ1994581zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Richard Dennis

Publication date 1 November 2018

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp582.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

imperfect credibilityrobust policymakingtime-consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Robust monetary policy in a small open economy
• ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1790588
• Robust policies in a sticky information economy
• ROBUST MONETARY POLICY IN THE NEW KEYNESIAN FRAMEWORK

Cites work

• Fiscal policy under loose commitment
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 437299 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48691 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1790587 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1790590 (Why is no real title available?)
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Models of Policy under Stochastic Replanning
• Optimal stochastic linear systems with exponential performance criteria and their relation to deterministic differential games
• Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime
• Recursive robust estimation and control without commitment
• Robust control with commitment: a modification to Hansen-Sargent
• Robustness
• Solution of macromodels with Hansen-Sargent robust policies: some extensions
• Substitution, Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior of Consumption and Asset Returns: A Theoretical Framework

Cited in

(9)

• On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies
• Defending against speculative attacks: the policy Maker's reputation
• Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers
• The value of monetary policy commitment under imperfect fiscal credibility
• What kind of central bank competence?
• On credible monetary policy and private government information
• Credible forward guidance
• Credibility of central banks in monetary economies
• Robust control with commitment: a modification to Hansen-Sargent

This page was built for publication: Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1994581)