Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2014.05.004zbMath1402.91436OpenAlexW3122055460MaRDI QIDQ1994581

Richard Dennis

Publication date: 1 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp582.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

time-consistencyimperfect credibilityrobust policymaking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

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• Robust control with commitment: a modification to Hansen-Sargent
• Solution of macromodels with Hansen-Sargent robust policies: some extensions
• Fiscal policy under loose commitment
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Recursive robust estimation and control without commitment
• Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime
• Models of Policy under Stochastic Replanning
• Substitution, Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior of Consumption and Asset Returns: A Theoretical Framework
• Optimal stochastic linear systems with exponential performance criteria and their relation to deterministic differential games
• Robustness

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