Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy
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Publication:1994581
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2014.05.004zbMath1402.91436OpenAlexW3122055460MaRDI QIDQ1994581
Publication date: 1 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp582.pdf
Cites Work
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- Robust control with commitment: a modification to Hansen-Sargent
- Solution of macromodels with Hansen-Sargent robust policies: some extensions
- Fiscal policy under loose commitment
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Recursive robust estimation and control without commitment
- Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime
- Models of Policy under Stochastic Replanning
- Substitution, Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior of Consumption and Asset Returns: A Theoretical Framework
- Optimal stochastic linear systems with exponential performance criteria and their relation to deterministic differential games
- Robustness
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