Fiscal policy under loose commitment

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.10.003MaRDI QIDQ972871zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Davide Debortoli, Ricardo Nunes

Publication date 21 May 2010

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentfiscal policyno-commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Fiscal policy and uncertainty
• Fiscal policy in debt constrained economies
• Fiscal policy interventions at the zero lower bound
• Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment
• Fiscal Policy in an Expectations-Driven Liquidity Trap
• Fiscal Policy in Good Times and Bad
• Budgetary-neutral fiscal policy rules and external adjustment
• Fiscal rules and discretion under persistent shocks
• Fiscal policy in good and bad times
• Fiscal policy in a Lucasian general equilibrium model with productive government spending

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52448 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
• Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes
• Models of Policy under Stochastic Replanning
• Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives
• Optimal taxation in an RBC model: A linear-quadratic approach
• Projection methods for solving aggregate growth models
• The Japanese saving rate between 1960 and 2000: productivity, policy changes, and demographics
• Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution
• Time-Consistent Public Policy

Cited in

(12)

• On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies
• Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy
• Time-consistent optimal fiscal policy over the business cycle
• The value of monetary policy commitment under imperfect fiscal credibility
• The commitment value of funding pensions
• Distortionary taxes and public investment when government promises are not enforceable
• Fiscal consolidation in a currency union: spending cuts vs. tax hikes
• Escaping expectation traps: how much commitment is required?
• Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games
• An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers
• Social discounting and incentive compatible fiscal policy
• Rules versus discretion in Central Bank communication

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