Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Persistent Shocks
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Publication:4615887
DOI10.3982/ECTA11207zbMath1419.91507OpenAlexW2110410031MaRDI QIDQ4615887
Publication date: 29 January 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11207
macroeconomic policymechanism designhyperbolic discountingpolitical economyasymmetric and private information
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