Social discounting and incentive compatible fiscal policy

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.09.001MaRDI QIDQ694749zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Catarina Reis

Publication date 13 December 2012

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2009/paper_413.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

incidencedebtfiscal policyoptimal taxation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Non-linear capital taxation without commitment
• Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives
• Optimal taxes without commitment
• Public debt and optimal taxes without commitment
• Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model
• TAXING CAPITAL INCOME AS PIGOUVIAN CORRECTION: THE ROLE OF DISCOUNTING THE FUTURE
• Taxation without commitment

Cited in

(11)

• Taxation without commitment
• Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes
• Social Discounting and Intergenerational Pareto
• Distortionary taxes and public investment when government promises are not enforceable
• Non-linear capital taxation without commitment
• Dynamic inconsistency and non-preferential taxation of foreign capital
• Fiscal policy in debt constrained economies
• Optimal taxes without commitment
• Capital taxation and government debt policy with public discounting
• Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, paternalism and optimal mixed taxation
• Endogenous discounting, wariness, and efficient capital taxation

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