Social discounting and incentive compatible fiscal policy

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.09.001zbMATH Open1258.91162OpenAlexW2074447012MaRDI QIDQ694749FDOQ694749

Authors: Catarina Reis 

Publication date: 13 December 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2009/paper_413.pdf

Recommendations

• Taxation without commitment
• Optimal taxes without commitment
• TAXING CAPITAL INCOME AS PIGOUVIAN CORRECTION: THE ROLE OF DISCOUNTING THE FUTURE
• Fiscal policy under loose commitment
• Capital taxation and government debt policy with public discounting

zbMATH Keywords

incidencedebtfiscal policyoptimal taxation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model
• Public debt and optimal taxes without commitment
• TAXING CAPITAL INCOME AS PIGOUVIAN CORRECTION: THE ROLE OF DISCOUNTING THE FUTURE
• Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives
• Taxation without commitment
• Non-linear capital taxation without commitment
• Optimal taxes without commitment

Cited In (10)

• Taxation without commitment
• Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes
• Social Discounting and Intergenerational Pareto
• Non-linear capital taxation without commitment
• Distortionary taxes and public investment when government promises are not enforceable
• Dynamic inconsistency and non-preferential taxation of foreign capital
• Fiscal policy in debt constrained economies
• Capital taxation and government debt policy with public discounting
• Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, paternalism and optimal mixed taxation
• Endogenous discounting, wariness, and efficient capital taxation

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