Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime

DOI10.2307/2297617zbMATH Open0555.90022OpenAlexW2075535574MaRDI QIDQ3220293FDOQ3220293

Authors: David K. Backus, John Driffill 

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297617

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zbMATH Keywords

change in regimerational expectationsmixed strategiesBayesian learningdynamic path of an economygame between the government and the private sectormacroeconomic policy game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economic growth models (91B62)

Cited In (19)

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• Credibility and time consistency in a stochastic world
• Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy
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• Robust control with commitment: a modification to Hansen-Sargent
• For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment
• An interpretation of the collapsing process of the Bretton Woods system
• Expectations Dynamics: Policy, Announcements and Limits to Dynamic Inconsistency
• Why join a currency union? A note on the impact of beliefs on the choice of monetary policy
• Escaping expectation traps: how much commitment is required?
• Electing monetary policymakers according to inflation performance
• The interest sensitivity of wealth in the life cycle model
• Time consistent taxation by a government with redistributive goals
• Fiscal and monetary policy interactions: a game theory approach
• Macroeconomic effects of inflationary shocks with durable and non-durable consumption
• An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers
• Some unresolved issues in the application of control theory to economic policy-making
• Learning rational expectations in a policy game
• An anticipative feedback solution for the infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game.

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