Fiscal and monetary policy interactions: a game theory approach

DOI10.1007/s10479-013-1379-3zbMath1271.91111MaRDI QIDQ363582

Helton Saulo, Leandro C. Rêgo, Jose Angelo Divino

Publication date: 3 September 2013

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-013-1379-3

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; monetary policy; cooperative solution; fiscal policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A12: Cooperative games

91G50: Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.)

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Uses Software

• Dynare

Cites Work

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