Monetary and fiscal policy interaction and government debt stabilization
DOI10.1007/BF01226006zbMATH Open0841.90054OpenAlexW1973719948WikidataQ57787509 ScholiaQ57787509MaRDI QIDQ1908515FDOQ1908515
Authors: Bas van Aarle, A. Lans Bovenberg, Matthias G. Raith 
Publication date: 31 March 1996
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01226006
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strategic interactionfiscal authoritiesmonetary authoritiesNash open-loop equilibriaStackelberg open-loop equilibria
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)
Cites Work
Cited In (15)
- SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
- Delegation and Fiscal policy in the open economy: More bad news for Rogoff's delegation game
- MONETARY AND FISCAL INTERACTIONS: SHORT‐RUN AND LONG‐RUN IMPLICATIONS
- Monetary-fiscal interaction and quantitative easing
- Strategic interactions in U.S. monetary and fiscal policies
- GOVERNMENT POLICY IN MONETARY ECONOMIES*
- Linear Quadratic Differential Games: An Overview
- Fiscal policy and macroeconomic stabilizations: what are the gains from cooperation?
- Credible Linear-Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
- Moving horizon control in dynamic games
- Strategic interactions among central bank and national fiscal authorities in a monetary union subject to asymmetric country shocks
- Debt stabilisation and dynamic interaction between monetary and fiscal policy: in medio stat virtus
- On the open-loop Nash equilibrium in LQ-games
- Computational aspects of the open-loop Nash equilibrium in linear quadratic games
- Identification of efficient subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of differential games
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