A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption

DOI10.1007/S10479-014-1567-9zbMATH Open1348.91213OpenAlexW1975838504MaRDI QIDQ338903FDOQ338903

Authors: Roy Cerqueti, Raffaella Coppier 

Publication date: 7 November 2016

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-014-1567-9

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zbMATH Keywords

game theoryincome inequalitytax evasioncorruptionethnolinguistic fractionalizationtax revenues

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Mathematical economics (91B99) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Fractionalization
• Organized vs. competitive corruption
• Dynamics in divide the money game with bribing
• Optimal dynamic law enforcement
• Fiscal and monetary policy interactions: a game theory approach
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Corruption, growth and ethnic fractionalization: a theoretical model
• Interactions between government and firms: a differential game approach

Cited In (2)

• Tax compliance with uncertain income: a stochastic control model
• A decomposition algorithm for computing income taxes with pass-through entities and its application to the Chilean case

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