A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption
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Publication:338903
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51486 (Why is no real title available?)
- Corruption, growth and ethnic fractionalization: a theoretical model
- Dynamics in divide the money game with bribing
- Fiscal and monetary policy interactions: a game theory approach
- Fractionalization
- Interactions between government and firms: a differential game approach
- Optimal dynamic law enforcement
- Organized vs. competitive corruption
Cited in
(4)- Tax compliance with uncertain income: a stochastic control model
- A decomposition algorithm for computing income taxes with pass-through entities and its application to the Chilean case
- Corruption, growth and ethnic fractionalization: a theoretical model
- Games and network structures on corruption, income inequality, and tax control
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