Optimal dynamic law enforcement

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(01)00235-1MaRDI QIDQ1848611zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Gustav Feichtinger, Waltraud Grienauer, Gernot Tragler

Publication date 13 November 2002

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0377-2217(01)00235-1

zbMATH Keywords

optimal controlsaddle pointeconomics of crime and punishmentpath constraint

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90)

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3992265 (Why is no real title available?)
• A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption
• Optimal Growth with a Convex-Concave Production Function
• Optimal allocation of drug control efforts: A differential game analysis

Cited in

(25)

• The political economy of indirect control
• Leading bureaucracies to the tipping point: an alternative model of multiple stable equilibrium levels of corruption
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• Optimal enforcement expenditure for a model of rule-breaking when sanctions are costly to impose
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2154247 (Why is no real title available?)
• Dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with alternating leaders
• External conversions of player strategy in an evolutionary game: A cost-benefit analysis through optimal control
• Cycles of violence: a dynamic control analysis
• Fighting cheaters: how and how much to invest
• When do more police induce more crime?
• Structural estimation of a Becker-Ehrlich equilibrium model of crime: allocating police across cities to reduce crime
• A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption
• Gustav Feichtinger celebrates his 70th birthday
• Dynamic game of offending and law enforcement: a stochastic extension
• Optimal control analysis of a simple criminal prosecution model
• Dynamical analysis and effects of law enforcement in a social interaction model
• Defeating the gang: The social dynamics of compliance in a rake‐off economy*
• Dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop complete information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1446125 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1848080 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal penalties for repeat offenders -- the role of offence history
• THE DYNAMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
• Offense control taking into account heterogeneity of age
• On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers

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