Optimal dynamic law enforcement
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3991198 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3992265 (Why is no real title available?)
- A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption
- Optimal Growth with a Convex-Concave Production Function
- Optimal allocation of drug control efforts: A differential game analysis
Cited in
(24)- The political economy of indirect control
- Leading bureaucracies to the tipping point: an alternative model of multiple stable equilibrium levels of corruption
- An extension of the Becker proposition to non-expected utility theory
- Optimal enforcement expenditure for a model of rule-breaking when sanctions are costly to impose
- Optimal enforcement on a pure Seller's market of illicit drugs
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2154247 (Why is no real title available?)
- Dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with alternating leaders
- External conversions of player strategy in an evolutionary game: A cost-benefit analysis through optimal control
- Cycles of violence: a dynamic control analysis
- Fighting cheaters: how and how much to invest
- When do more police induce more crime?
- Structural estimation of a Becker-Ehrlich equilibrium model of crime: allocating police across cities to reduce crime
- A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption
- Gustav Feichtinger celebrates his 70th birthday
- Dynamic game of offending and law enforcement: a stochastic extension
- Optimal control analysis of a simple criminal prosecution model
- Dynamical analysis and effects of law enforcement in a social interaction model
- Dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop complete information
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1848080 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimal penalties for repeat offenders -- the role of offence history
- THE DYNAMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
- Offense control taking into account heterogeneity of age
- On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers
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