Corruption, evasion and environmental policy: a game theory approach

DOI10.1093/IMAMAN/DPU019MaRDI QIDQ5382689zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Roy Cerqueti, Raffaella Coppier

Publication date 18 June 2019

Published in IMA Journal of Management Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11573/1364502

zbMATH Keywords

corruptionenvironmental policygame theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cited in

(10)

• Corruption, pollution, and the Kuznets environment curve
• Environmental policy regulation and corporate compliance in evolutionary game models with well-mixed and structured populations
• Corruption, political competition and environmental policy
• A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption
• An asymmetrical game analysis of corporate political activity
• Taxation, Corruption and Punishment: Integrating Evolutionary Game into the Optimal Control of Government Policy
• Fiscal policy and corruption
• Environmental policies in a Stackelberg differential game
• The dynamics of corruption under an optional external supervision service
• Game modeling of collusion and influential factors under uniform taxpayer distribution

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