Environmental policy regulation and corporate compliance in evolutionary game models with well-mixed and structured populations
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2019.05.040zbMath1431.91269arXiv1802.09406OpenAlexW2952974940WikidataQ109152122 ScholiaQ109152122MaRDI QIDQ2312342
Gabriel Meyer Salomão, André Barreira da Silva Rocha
Publication date: 5 July 2019
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.09406
game theorycellular automataagent-based modelOR in environment and climate changestructured complex systems
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (5)
Cites Work
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- The evolutionary dynamics of audit
- Mutation in evolutionary games can increase average fitness at equilibrium
- Supply chain disruption management and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers in the quantity-setting duopoly situation with homogeneous goods
- Evolutionary Games in Complex Topologies
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Rock-scissors-paper game on regular small-world networks
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